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ISSUER AFFIRMATIVE DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS-AN




& ROBIN M. GOLDMAN**
I. INTRODUCTION
Questions relating to an issuer's obligation to disclose merger
negotiations, soft information, and bad news frequently present the
corporate lawyer with difficult counseling decisions.' These dilem-
mas are not resolved by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the SEC or the Commission) disclosure rules regarding the affirma-
tive duty to disclose, and the few judicial decisions on the subject
lack uniformity. This article reviews the relevant case law and SEC
regulations, provides a synthesis of divergent viewpoints, and offers
a framework for analysis.
Despite cogent arguments in favor of an affirmative duty to dis-
close,2 neither the courts nor the SEC has been willing to recognize
such a general mandate.' Affirmative disclosure obligations, how-
ever, clearly exist in a number of specific circumstances. For exam-
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; Of Counsel, Melnicove,
Kaufman, Weiner, Smouse & Garbis, P.A., Baltimore, Md. B.A., University of Michigan,
1972; J.D., UCLA, 1975; LL.M., Yale Law School, 1977.
** Associate, Melnicove, Kaufman, Weiner, Smouse & Garbis, P.A., Baltimore, Md.
B. Proc., University of Cape Town, South Africa, 1980; J.D., University of Maryland
School of Law, 1986; Member, Maryland Bar & Supreme Court of South Africa (TPD).
1. For related articles, see Block, Barton & Garfield, Affirmative Duty to Disclose Mate-
ial Information Concerning Issuer's Financial Condition and Business Plans, 40 Bus. LAW. 1243
(1985); Sheffey, Securities Law Responsibilities of Issuers to Respond to Rumors and Other Public-
ity: Reexamination of a Continuing Problem, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 755 (1982).
2. See Bauman, Rule lOb-5 and the Corporation's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. LJ.
935 (1979).
3. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1215 (1985); Texas Partners v. Conrock Co., 685 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1982);
South Coast Servs. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1271, 1273
(9th Cir. 1982). But see Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474
F.2d 514, 519 (10th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam) (indicating that corporation can violate
§ 10(b) in certain circumstances, such as undue delay in making disclosure), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 874 (1973). See generally M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES
AND REMEDIES § 2.03 (1986) (discussing affirmative duty to disclose). For an analysis of
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pie, an issuer must affirmatively disclose when: (1) SEC rules and
regulations require disclosure of specified information;4 (2) the is-
suer is purchasing or selling its stock in the securities markets;
5
(3) the issuer previously has made a public statement that, although
accurate when made, has become false or misleading as a result of
subsequent events;6 and (4) information has been leaked by, or ru-
mors in the marketplace are attributable to, the issuer. 7
In other situations the law is less clear as to the existence and
scope of an affirmative duty to disclose, such as in the case of
merger negotiations, soft information, and bad financial news.8 Be-
cause issuers and their counsel increasingly must determine whether
affirmative disclosure is required, this article examines these more
uncertain situations.
II. DUTY TO DISCLOSE MERGER NEGOTIATIONS
A. Disclosure of Merger Negotiations Generally
A number of questions concerning an issuer's duty to disclose
alternative sources of the duty to disclose and liability under the stock exchange rules,
see Bauman, supra note 2, at 976-88.
4. The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1982), and
SEC regulations thereunder, provide comprehensive specific disclosure requirements,
reflected in the requirements set forth in the various forms of registration statements.
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1982), required reports and filings include: (1) annual reports on form 10-K; (2) quar-
terly reports on form 10-Q and (3) current reports on form 8-K.
5. See Heublein, 742 F.2d at 756; Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange
Commission as Amicus Curiae, Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986) [hereinafter Michaels Memorandum]. An issuer also should
be required to affirmatively disclose when it has reason to know that an insider is trading
in the stock or when the issuer lacks adequate internal control mechanisms to regulate
insider trading practices. See infra note 39.
6. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
7. See Zuckerman v. Harnischfeger Corp., 591 F. Supp. 112, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 500 F. Supp. 278, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1981). See also In the Matter
of Sharon Steel Corp. as it Relates to Prompt Corporate Disclosure, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 18,271, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,049 (Nov.
19, 1981).
8. The SEC has commented that an affirmative duty to disclose negotiations only
arises in limited situations, and that otherwise a company "should usually be able to
negotiate in secrecy" and need not disclose even material negotiations. See Brief for the
Securities Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 24-25, Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786
F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986) (No. 84-3730), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987) [hereinafter
Levinson Brief]. This position may be overly broad. See in/ra notes 26-61 and accompany-
ing text.
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merger negotiations continue to challenge the perspicacity of the
securities bar, the SEC, and academia. These issues include
whether there is an affirmative duty to disclose preliminary merger
negotiations and "firm offers." Also, to determine the scope of any
disclosure mandate, materiality and timing questions must be re-
solved. This section addresses these important and recurring
issues.
Merger negotiations often have extremely significant conse-
quences for shareholders and the securities markets. As the Second
Circuit pointed out in SEC v. Geon Industries, 9 "a merger in which it is
bought out is the most important event that can occur in a ... cor-
poration's life, to wit, its death ... .0 Irrespective of the veracity
of this assertion, courts generally are reluctant to impose an affirma-
tive duty to disclose merger negotiations.'
A number of courts reason that, before there is a "firm offer"' 2
or "an agreement in principle encompassing fundamental terms,"3
merger discussions are "inherently fluid and ... shrouded with un-
certainty. '"14 Additionally, a premature public pronouncement
might quash the deal or mislead the investing public as to likely cor-
porate activity.15 Attempting to protect the investing public in these
9. 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
10. Id. at 47.
11. See supra note 3.
12. See South Coast Servs. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265,
1273 (9th Cir. 1982).
13. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 759 (3d Cir. 1984). See also Flamm v.
Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that corporation has no duty to dis-
close ongoing merger negotiations until agreement is reached on price and structure of
deal).
14. See Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983).
15. See Heublein, 742 F.2d at 757. The SEC's position is that the Third Circuit's con-
cerns were "overstated." See Michaels Memorandum, supra note 5, at 9. See also Susque-
hanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1084-86 (5th Cir. 1970) (finding
no obligation to disclose a unilateral offer to negotiate a merger). See generally Comment,
Corporate Disclosure of Merger Negotiations-When Does the Investor Have a Right to Know?, 36
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1155 (1985):
One reason that premature disclosure of merger negotiations might be
detrimental to investors is that, if word of a pending merger became public,
investors would tend to bid up the price of the corporation's stock closer to the
expected tender offer price ... [making the tender offer unattractive to share-
holders, and consequently the merger may be quashed].
A second reason for nondisclosure of ongoing merger negotiations is that
release of information about a tentative plan may disrupt the market by encour-
aging uninformed speculation.
Those persons who would buy stock on the basis of the occurrence of pre-
liminary merger discussions preceding a merger which never occurs, are left
"holding the bag" on a stock whose value was inflated purely by an inchoate
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circumstances, however, may be unduly paternalistic. Rather, un-
less it can be argued that sufficient business justification for main-
taining confidentiality is shown, all significant company and market
information within an issuer's knowledge should be disseminated to
the public in order to facilitate informed decisionmaking and market
reaction. Investors and financial professionals should not be denied
important information merely because the unsophisticated might at-
tach too much weight to it.
On the other hand, even though preliminary merger discus-
sions may be an important factor in investor decisionmaking, a rigid
rule mandating disclosure is inappropriate. Mergers, including
friendly takeovers and other negotiated acquisitions, are now essen-
tial components of the financial scene. Generally, the possibility of
a friendly merger between two unaffiliated entities begins as an idea
developed through a careful feeling-out process. Normally, one
company seeks to acquire another because it believes that it can be
more productive with the subject company's assets than its present
management, perhaps as a result of more efficient operation, syn-
ergy benefits, or a turn-around in the economy. 16 Because jobs,
pride, and, of course, money are at stake, delicate negotiation often
is the key, both to ultimate success and to keeping the acquisition
costs down. 17 An information leak can be devastating. If a company
is "not in play," meaning that there are no offers or rumors of a
prospective offer circulating in the marketplace, 18 a rule mandating
disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations could have a chilling
hope. If the announcement is withheld until an agreement in principle on a
merger is reached, the greatest good for the greatest number results. If the
merger occurs, all of the company's shareholders usually benefit; if no merger
agreement is reached, the stock performs as it would have in any event ....
Id. at 1159-60 n.27 (quoting Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1207 (3d Cir. 1982)).
16. See generally K. DAVIDSON, MEGAMERGERS: CORPORATE AMERICA'S BILLION-DOL-
LAR TAKEOVERS 32 1-32 (1985) (discussing economic functions of mergers).
17. See generally Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 126-29 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that in the absence
of insider trading or a material misstatement (or omission), an issuer has no duty to
disclose information until it has made a good faith determination that the information is
material and ripe for publication).
18. Once an offer has been made, shareholders and the markets ought to know
whether the subject company's management is negotiating with another party. SEC
schedule 14D-9, item 7 recognizes this point, calling for a subject company's manage-
ment to disclose merger negotiations even though the potential offeror's identity need
not be revealed if the negotiations are in a preliminary stage. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-
101 (1986). See generally Note, Disclosing the White Knight-l'hen Does the Duty, Arise?, 42
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1045 (1985).
926 [VOL. 46:923
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effect on merger discussions and, consequently, upon the en-
trepreneurial spirit that fuels our capital markets.
These arguments against an affirmative duty to disclose are less
compelling once an agreement in principle has been reached.
Although a number of courts have indicated that merger negotia-
tions may become material well before an agreement in principle
has been reached, 9 others have established an agreement in princi-
ple as the materiality threshold.2 ° In Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.2 1 the
Third Circuit espoused a bright-line test for materiality,22 holding
that information regarding merger negotiations is not material until
there is an agreement in principle encompassing fundamental
terms, namely, agreement as to price and structure. Until then, the
court reasoned, the merger negotiations have not ripened to the
point of materiality and, therefore, are immaterial as a matter of
law.2
In view ofjudicial authority to the contrary, the Third Circuit's
position may be overbroad.24 Furthermore, the SEC strongly dis-
agrees with Heublein's bright-line test. The Commission has asserted
that the materiality of merger negotiations depends on the signifi-
cance the merger would have for the company and its shareholders,
as well as on the probability that the merger will actually take
place. 5 From a consistency standpoint, the SEC's position appears
19. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Shapiro,
494 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Gaspar, [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,004 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Schlanger v. Four-
Phase Sys, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 128, 133-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); American Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 744-45 (E.D. Va. 1980).
20. SeeJordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987); Heublein, 742 F.2d
at 757. The Third Circuit's Heublein decision is especially significant because of the pau-
city ofjudicial analysis of the issue.
21. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985).
22. Id. at 756-59.
23. Id. Moreover, in Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1205-07 (3d Cir. 1982),
the court held that until an agreement in principle, or its functional equivalent, is actu-
ally reached, not merely reasonably certain, merger negotiations do not become mate-
rial. See also South Coast Servs. Corp., 669 F.2d at 1273 ("There is no duty to disclose
inquiries or indications of interest that do not fall within the category of firm or definite
offers.").
24. See cases cited supra note 19; infra notes 25-26.
25. See Levinson Brief, supra note 8, at 7. On appeal the Commission criticized the
district court's holding that, because the discussions would not imminently result in an
agreement in principle, the statements denying significant corporate events were not
materially misleading. Id. at 6. The Sixth Circuit in Levinson ultimately agreed with the
SEC. Cf. Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 749 (6th Cir. 1986) ("In analyzing
whether information regarding merger discussions is material such that it must be af-
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to be correct. For example, the insider trading provisions prohibit a
corporate fiduciary from purchasing stock based upon knowledge of
merger negotiations, even if those negotiations are preliminary.26
Otherwise, insiders, or the corporation itself, being privy to the ne-
gotiations, could take advantage of uninformed shareholders. As
the Supreme Court emphasized in Chiarella v. United States,27 such
conduct violates the obligations of corporate fiduciaries in the in-
sider trading context. Hence, it may be argued that if information
concerning preliminary merger negotiations is sufficiently important
so that insiders may not trade (or tip) on it, then such information
also should be considered material for purposes of requiring disclo-
sure to the marketplace as a whole.28
On the other hand, it may be contended that, while such infor-
mation may be important, it might not be sufficiently ripe for disclo-
sure to the marketplace for at least two reasons. First, the
information frequently is unreliable. 29 Second, even though knowl-
edge of preliminary merger negotiations may be important to an in-
dividual's investment decision,"0 public revelation may cause the
market to react as if the negotiations were finalized-a consequence
that could result in large investor losses if the deal were to
collapse.3
A bright-line test is desirable because it provides a degree of
certainty in an area that has enormous liability risks.32 Without such
firmatively disclosed . . . , the discussions and their progress are the primary considera-
tions."), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987).
26. See, e.g., SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1306-07 (2d Cir. 1974).
27. 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that corporate insiders breach their fiduciary duty,
and hence violate § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, when they trade on material, nonpublic
information).
28. Cf. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) ("An omitted fact is
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it
important in deciding how to vote [or invest]."). The availability of information regard-
ing merger negotiations will allow the marketplace and constituents of the securities
markets, either themselves or with the aid of advisers, to evaluate the information
disclosed.
29. See infra text accompanying note 58.
30. Cf SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (find-
ing that knowledge of remarkably rich ore drill core, upon which insiders traded, was
material inside information), cert. denied sub nor. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
31. See supra notes 12-15. Cf "Goodyear Tire to Buy Interest from Sir James," Wall
St. J., Nov. 21, 1986, at 3, col. 1, ("Speculators already reeling from losses [stemming
from the collapse of takeover stocks] in the wake of the Boesky scandal said Goodyear's
announcement [stating that the Goldsmith takeover bid had been thwarted] was a pain-
ful blow.").
32. The SEC criticized this test as "unrealistic." See Michaels Memorandun, supra note
5, at 5. Considerable authority exists for the proposition that materiality is a question of
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a standard, one is left with the uncertainty of trying to determine at
what point negotiations become material. Thus, an uncertain mate-
riality test creates difficult counseling situations and liability con-
cerns, particularly given that any adjudication will be determined
with the benefit of hindsight.
The SEC, despite its criticism of the bright-line materiality
threshold, has asserted that, in the absence of an SEC regulation or
judicial principle mandating disclosure, even material merger nego-
tiations need not be disclosed."3 This contention is misleading.
Although correct as a general statement of the law, the more specific
situations in which disclosure is required tend to make the general
proposition overly broad. For example, even though corporations
may have no general duty to disclose even material information, this
freedom from disclosure may be short-lived. Because the antifraud
provisions prohibit materially misleading statements, 34 and state-
ments must be made in certain well-defined circumstances,3 5 includ-
ing the various periodic reports a company is required to file,3 6 the
proposition often is correct only for a limited period of time.3 7
Moreover, as a matter of public policy, the SEC's contention
that even material merger negotiations need not be disclosed is
overstated. First, unless there exists a legitimate business justifica-
tion for nondisclosure, such as a loss of potential revenue or strong
indication that the deal would be scuttled due to premature an-
nouncement, 38 shareholders and the markets are entitled to such in-
formation. Second, as a practical matter, once the parties have
fact to be determined by the circumstances of each case. See TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at
449 (stating that information is material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a rea-
sonable shareholder would consider it important" in making his investment decision).
33. In its amicus brief in Levinson the SEC stated:
In urging that merger negotiations may become material before there is
certainty of an agreement, we are not suggesting that material merger negotia-
tions therefore have to be disclosed to the public as a matter of course. We
agree with the court below that corporations ordinarily have no duty to disclose
even material merger negotiations ....
Levinson Brief, supra note 8, at 7. See also Michaels Memorandum, supra note 5, at 3 n.2 ("[Iln
general, if a company is not responding to a tender offer, does not trade in its own stock,
and neither issues a public statement about corporate developments nor is responsible
for word leaking into the market, it need not disclose even material negotiations.").
34. See, e.g., Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); SEC rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
35. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
36. Id. See also infra notes 124-134 and accompanying text.
37. See infra Section III's discussion regarding disclosure of bad news.
38. Cf State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981)
(finding issuer not required to disclose when terms of new contract required
confidentiality).
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reached a firm agreement to merge, public disclosure of the offer's
terms usually occurs promptly. Under such circumstances, there
usually is no business reason to keep the information confidential.
During the period in which the negotiations are kept confidential,
insider trading by either company or their fiduciaries is forbidden.
Because such trading may be attributable to the company39 and be-
cause issuers are concerned with maintaining continued good rela-
tions with media sources, disclosure of agreements in principle
ordinarily occurs promptly after they are made.
Finally, the SEC's position that material merger information
need not be disclosed may adversely affect shareholders and the se-
curities markets. An example is when a prospective offeror, who is
interested in consummating a merger transaction only on friendly
terms, makes a "firm offer" directly to incumbent management, who
rejects it. Such an offer clearly is material and, according to a
number of courts, must be disclosed to shareholders.4" Yet it seems
that the SEC would not require disclosure. 41 Consequently, share-
holders and the markets are denied the opportunity to ascertain that
an unaffiliated party is willing to pay at least a certain price for the
company, a valuable indicator of true market value of the company's
stock.4 2 In addition, shareholders are denied the opportunity to as-
certain whether incumbent management is unreceptive to offers,
either because such offers pose a threat to management's position
or due to management's undisclosed desire to maintain the com-
pany as an independent entity.43 The Commission's position is puz-
zling because it undermines investor protection and conflicts with
39. If the company does not have adequate procedures in place to protect against
insider trading, it arguably may be held liable as a controlling person. See Exchange Act
§ 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982). In some jurisdictions, the company may be held lia-
ble under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See generally M. STEINBERG, supra note 3,
§§ 10.03-.04 (and cases discussed therein).
40. See Texas Partners v. Conrock Co., 685 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1982); South
Coast Servs. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1273 (9th Cir.
1982); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1294-95 (2d Cir. 1973).
41. See Levinson Brief, supra note 8.
42. Cf Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711-12 (Del. 1983) (indicating that
under certain circumstances, disclosure is necessary to satisfy directors' duty of fair deal-
ing); Steinberg & Lindahl, The Aew Law of Squeeze-Out Mergers, 62 WASH. U.L.Q 351, 403-
12 (1984) (and sources discussed therein).
43. Cf. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating
that although target management must disclose defensive actions, there is no duty to
disclose subjective motivation). See generally Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Lynch &
Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901
(1979).
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respectable case law requiring disclosure.4"
B. Duty to Disclose Versus Duty Not to Mislead
Another issue regarding disclosure of merger negotiations,
raised in the Third Circuit's opinion in Heublein, is the failure of
some courts to distinguish the duty to disclose from the duty not to
mislead."5 In Heublein, when the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
asked the issuer to comment on the significant increase in the trad-
ing of its stock that day, the company released the following public
statement: "The company was aware of no reason that would ex-
plain the activity in its stock trading on the NYSE today.""6 In fact,
merger negotiations were taking place at that time. The Third Cir-
cuit reasoned that, because an agreement in principle encompassing
fundamental terms had not yet been reached, the negotiations had
not ripened to the point of materiality, and, therefore, Heublein had
no affirmative duty to disclose the merger negotiations."7 Instead of
considering whether the public statement violated the antifraud pro-
visions, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and rule lOb-
5,48 the Third Circuit concluded that because Heublein had no duty
to disclose the merger negotiations, the public statement, as a mat-
ter of law, "was not false, inaccurate, or misleading."" 9 Judge Hig-
ginbotham dissented vigorously, pointing out that the duty not to
mislead exists "whether or not" there is a duty to disclose.50
The majority's failure to recognize this distinction drew harsh
criticism from the SEC, which bluntly opined that Heublein "was
wrongly decided."'" In the Carnation release 52 the Commission
warned that it would take enforcement action against issuers who
44. See supra notes 1-7, 40 and accompanying text.
45. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 758-62 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1215 (1985).
46. Id. at 758.
47. Id. at 758-59.
48. See supra note 34.
49. 742 F.2d at 759. The court reached this conclusion despite finding that the cor-
poration's executives "clearly knew of information that might have accounted for the
increase in trading ..... Id. The majority reasoned that "there was no indication that
any of this privileged information had leaked or that they knew of, or had, information
that insiders were engaged in trading." Id. See also Etshokin v. Texasgulf, Inc., 612 F.
Supp. 1212, 1217 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (finding that duty was to ascertain whether company
knew of reason for trading activity, not to ascertain whether there actually was a reason);
but see cases cited supra note 19.
50. 742 F.2d at 760 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
51. See In the Matter of Carnation Company, Exchange Act Release No. 22,214,
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,596 n.8 (July 8,
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made such materially misleading public statements.53 Counsel
would be well advised to heed the SEC's position, particularly be-
cause other courts are in general agreement with the Commission
on this issue.54 In its Carnation release the SEC stated:
Whenever an issuer makes a public statement or responds
to an inquiry from a stock exchange official concerning ru-
mors, unusual market activity, possible corporate develop-
ments or any other matter, the statement must be
materially accurate and complete. If the issuer is aware of
nonpublic information concerning acquisition discussions
that are occurring at the time the statement is made, the
issuer has an obligation to disclose sufficient information
concerning the discussions to prevent the statements made
from being materially misleading .... Thus in the Com-
mission's view, an issuer statement that there is no corpo-
rate development that would account for unusual market
activity in its stock, made while the issuer is engaged in ac-
quisition discussions, may be materially false and
misleading. 55
In Carnation the SEC also noted that "an issuer that wants to prevent
premature disclosure of nonpublic preliminary merger negotiations
can, in appropriate circumstances, give a 'no comment' response to
press inquiries concerning rumors or unusual market activity." '56
However, "[a] 'no comment' response would not be appropriate
1985) [hereinafter Carnation release]. Accord Levinson Brief, supra note 8; Schlanger v.
Four-Phase Systems, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 128, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
52. Carnation release, supra note 51, at 87,597.
53. In view of the cost and inconvenience of challenging the SEC's position, the
Commission's Carnation release effectively nullifies Heublein.
54. See e.g., Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S.
Ct. 1284 (1987); Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 582 F. Supp 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)
(stating that one purpose underlying the Exchange Act is to protect investors against
inequities in trading, particularly when trading has been "stimulated by the publication
of false or misleading corporate information releases"), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v.
SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
The fact that negotiations are taking place must be disclosed in the company's
schedule 14D-9, which requires disclosure of merger negotiations that are taking place
during the time that a third-party tender offer has been made, even if the final price and
other material terms have yet to be negotiated. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1986). See In
the Matter of Revlon, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 23,320, [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,006 (June 16, 1986) [hereinafter Revlon release]
(finding company statement that it "may undertake negotiations," when in fact negotia-
tions were underway, was misleading since such a statement implied that negotiations
had not yet begun).
55. Carnation release, supra note 51, at 87,595-96.
56. Id. at 87,596 n.6.
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where, inter alia, the issuer has made a statement that has been ren-
dered materially false or misleading as a result of subsequent events
or market rumors attributable to leaks from the issuer." 57
Public pronouncements clearly are intended to influence inves-
tors and, if inaccurate or incomplete, may mislead investors as to
likely corporate and market activity. This consequence is precisely
what the antifraud provisions are designed to prevent. The concept
of materiality, therefore, should focus on the specific matter at hand.
In the case of merger negotiations, materiality generally should be
measured in terms of ripeness, meaning that, until the discussions
are sufficiently advanced, the likelihood and terms of a merger are
too uncertain to expect investors reasonably to rely on such infor-
mation in their decisionmaking. On the other hand, in the case of
public statements actually made, materiality refers to the signifi-
cance such statements are likely to have on investor decisionmak-
ing.5 s Once a public statement is made, it must be accurate and
complete. If the details are not yet ripe, the issuer simply can state
that the terms still are being negotiated and that an agreement in
principle has or has not been reached, as the case may be.59
C. Summation
As the preceding analysis indicates, there are respectable argu-
ments both for and against an affirmative duty to disclose prelimi-
nary merger negotiations. On balance, however, requiring
disclosure of merger negotiations would not ordinarily benefit in-
57. Id. Evidently, the SEC relied heavily on Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 582
F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), which was decided on facts similar to those in Heublein.
One disadvantage of a "no comment" response is that investors may interpret it as a
corporate device to withhold information concerning significant developments. This
problem may be ameliorated by the issuer's adopting a policy of not commenting on
rumors in the marketplace. In any event, the SEC's position likely will encourage no-
comment responses, a consequence that fails to promote timely disclosure to the capital
markets. On the other hand, John J. Phelan, Chairman of the New York Stock Ex-
change, has asserted that " 'no comment' today means: 'I didn't know it was that seri-
ous,'" and that the "no comment" response usually signals the market that a material
event may be occurring. See Little Can Be Done to Stop Rumors, Exchange Officials, Others Tell
Forum, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 253 (1986). It is questionable, however, whether a
"no comment" response furthers the disclosure goals of the securities laws. One alter-
native would be for the Commission to establish (by rulemaking) standards calling for
disclosure of merger negotiations. See id. at 253(comments of Royce Griffin, President
of the North American Securities Administrators Association).
58. Cf Revlon release, supra note 54, at 88,146 (finding that target's amendment of
schedule 14D-9 on October 2, 1985, did not discharge duty to do so "promptly"; sched-
ule should have been amended and information disseminated at least before the market
opened on September 30).
59. See Carnation release, supra note 51, at 87,595-97.
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vestors or issuers, because the negotiations have not ripened suffi-
ciently so as to create a reasonably certain expectation that the
merger will be consummated (i.e., reasonable marketplace reliance).
However, the SEC's contention that the Heublein test is too rigid is
not without merit, because there are times when preliminary merger
information can be particularly critical to investor decisionmaking.6 °
Unfortunately, the SEC's criticism does not offer any workable
guidelines, and, therefore, is unresponsive to the problem. If the
Commission believes that under certain circumstances merger ne-
gotiations may be material before an agreement in principle is
reached, the prudent route would be for the SEC to promulgate
specific rules, as it did in the tender offer context, 6' to remedy any
disclosure deficiency.
In sum, once a firm offer has been made or an agreement in
principle has been reached, there is little reason to withhold disclo-
sure absent proof by the issuer of a valid business justification. The
bright-line test advocated in Heublein provides an effective guideline
for both the courts and the industry. Agreement on the fundamen-
tal terms, encompassing price and structure, is a straightforward re-
quirement, and essential to the mutually successful negotiation of
any business transaction. Hence, from a counseling as well as an
enforcement standpoint, the advantages of a clear rule in this set-
ting, rather than an ad hoc standard, normally will benefit both issu-
ers and investors.
III. DuTY TO DISCLOSE "SOFT" INFORMATION
Traditionally, the securities laws have required disclosure of
"hard" information, that is, factual, objectively verifiable data.62
"Soft" information, on the other hand, predominantly focuses on
forward-looking statements, such as projections, forecasts, and pre-
dictions.6 3 Moreover, soft information need not necessarily relate
to expectations regarding the future, but may include any statement
that cannot be factually supported, whether due to a lack of substan-
tiating data or because the information consists primarily of subjec-
60. E.g., SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1306-07 (2d Cir. 1974) ("Although the ne-
gotiations had not jelled to the point where a merger was probable, the possibility was
not so remote that, when considered in the light of a projected increase of at least 60%
in [the issuer's] earnings per share, it might have influenced a reasonable investor.").
61. See SEC schedule 14D-9, item 7, 17 CF.R. § 240.14d-101 at 205 (1986).
62. See generally Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084,
[1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117, at 81,938 (June 25, 1979).
63. Id.
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tive evaluations or opinions.64
The area of soft information presents a classic example of the
tensions between the duty to disclose and the duty not to mislead.
Although the issuer generally has a duty to disclose information that
reasonable shareholders would consider important in their invest-
ment decisionmaking, 65 the duty to do so accurately and completely
so as not to mislead investors often is a task fraught with complica-
tions. Difficulties inherent in the disclosure obligation include accu-
rately interpreting the scope of this duty in a given situation, the
pressure of providing such disclosure within the desired time con-
straints, and ensuring the protection of the issuer's business inter-
ests. A rule mandating disclosure of soft information could
exacerbate these difficulties because of the often subjective, specula-
tive nature of such information.
Until the mid-1970s the SEC and the courts discouraged and
even prohibited the disclosure of soft information. 66 The major
concern has been that investors, particularly the unsophisticated,
might attach too much significance to information that is of ques-
tionable reliability. 6v On the other hand, the flow of soft informa-
tion to the marketplace may enable sophisticated investors more
intelligently to evaluate the total mix of information influencing
their decisionmaking. 6
8
Merger mania has brought the issue of disclosing soft informa-
tion into current focus. For example, in a departure from its tradi-
tional view that forward-looking information is untrustworthy and,
hence, discouraged, the SEC adopted rule 175,69 which encourages
64. See Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
254, 255 (1972) (discussing five categories of "soft" information).
65. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); supra notes 4-7 and
accompanying text.
66. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1294 (2d Cir. 1973); Kohn v.
American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874
(1972); Guidelines for the Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are in
Registration, Securities Act Release No. 5180, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 78,192 (Aug. 16, 1971). But see Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (advocating disclosure).
67. See, e.g., South Coast Servs. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d
1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982).
68. See generally Note, Corporate and Insider Disclosure of Asset Appraisals Under Rules lOb-5
and 14a-9, 61 B.U.L. REV. 683, 707-12 (1981). See also Denison Mines, Ltd. v.
Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 820 (D. Del. 1974).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1986). Accord SEC rule 3b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1986);
SEC regulation S-K, item 10(b), 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (1986) (encouraging use of
"management's projections of future economic performance that have a reasonable ba-
sis and are presented in an appropriate format").
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issuer use of financial projections and establishes a "safe harbor"
for parties who invoke the rule.y° While a small number of courts
have extended this position to require issuer disclosure of forward-
looking statements in certain circumstances, 7' others continue to
adhere to the traditional philosophical concerns as a basis for not
imposing liability upon issuers who decline to disclose soft informa-
tion.72 Due to the potentially massive liability consequences and the
70. Rule 175 creates "a safe harbor from the applicable liability provisions of the
federal securities laws for statements relating to or containing (1)' projections of
reserves, income (loss), earnings (loss) per share or other financial items, such as capital
expenditures, dividends, or capital structure, (2) management plans and objectives for
future company operations, and (3) future economic performance included in manage-
ment's discussion and analysis of the summary of earnings or quarterly income state-
ments." Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, supra note 62, at 81,938. Rule 175 precludes
liability on the basis of an issuer's forward-looking statement unless the plaintiff estab-
lishes that "such statement was made or reaffirmed without a reasonable basis or was
disclosed other than in good faith." 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(a) (1986). See generally Fiflis,
Soft Information: The SEC's Former Exogenous Zone, 26 UCLA L. REV. 95 (1978); Note,
Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Projections and the Goals of Securities Regulation, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 1525 (1981); Note, The SEC Safe Harbor for Forecasts-A Step in the Right Direction?,
1980 DUKE L.J. 607; Note, Disclosure of Future-Oriented Information Under the Securities Laws,
88 YALE L.J. 338 (1978).
71. See, e.g., Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984).
72. See, e.g., Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985); Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1980); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,
478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1974). Although the Sixth Circuit has held that soft information
must be disclosed if the predictions underlying the information are substantially certain
to happen, see Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 252-53 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 3272 (1986); Starkman, 772 F.2d at 241, the substantial certainty requirement ap-
pears quite similar to the SEC's policy that presently known data may be required to be
disclosed. Compare SEC regulation S-K, item 303(a), instructions to 303(a), no. 7
("presently known data which will impact upon future operating results ...may be
required to be disclosed") with Starkman, 772 F.2d at 241 (example of "substantially
certain" information is "fixed plan of [future] corporate activity") and Arber v. Essex
Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 421 (6th Cir.) (distinguishing fixed plan of future corporate
activity from educated guesses or predictions), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974).
Recently, in Walker v. Action Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 952 (1986), the Fourth Circuit held that in certain circumstances there is no
duty to disclose financial projections. Mr. Walker alleged, inter alia, that Action Indus-
tries' failure to disclose in tender offer statements certain sales projections prepared for
its internal use violated rule lOb-5. After reviewing the approaches taken by the Sev-
enth, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, the Walker court cautioned that "[w]e do not
specifically adopt any of the various positions held by other circuits regarding whether a
duty exists to disclose financial projections." Id. at 709 n. 11. Instead, the court held that
due to the following circumstances, Action Industries was not required to disclose its
internal financial projections:
(i) The SEC has declined to impose a duty to disclose financial projections in the
context of Rule 13e-4 tender offer statements.
(ii) The SEC has declined to impose a duty to disclose financial projections in
disclosure documents generally. Because "the current SEC regulatory environment [is
in] an experimental state regarding financial projections disclosures . . . further transi-
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lack of clear guidance in many jurisdictions, this area poses trouble-
some concerns for the securities practitioner. A helpful approach to
synthesizing the law and extracting a framework of analysis is to ex-
amine the pertinent SEC regulations and the rationale underlying
court decisions, both before the SEC reconsidered its view discour-
aging the disclosure of soft information as well as subsequent SEC
and judicial action.
The SEC's traditional position discouraging soft information
may be best understood by reference to the historical context in
which that policy was adopted. Viewed in this setting, the securities
laws were an attempt, at least in part, to ameliorate abuses that were
everyday occurrences in the financial marketplace, including the
trading by insiders (and their tippees) on confidential information
and the practice of stock manipulation. 3 These abuses ultimately
contributed to the great market crash of 1929."4 As a result, Con-
gress designed the securities laws to prohibit certain insider prac-
tion, from permissive disclosure to required disclosure, should be occasioned by con-
gressional or SEC adoption of more stringent disclosure requirements for financial
projections, rather than by the courts." Id. at 709.
(iii) The financial projections at issue were uncertain and frequently changing, and
thus potentially misleading to investors. Indeed, disclosure could have prompted a law-
suit for material misstatements.
(iv) Because of the frequency (at least monthly) and volatility (forecasts changed
substantially) of the projections at issue, disclosure would have required virtually con-
stant updates and therefore, would have been impractical, if not unreasonable.
The Walker court carefully noted, however, that "[w]e do not hold that there is no
duty to disclose financial projections under any circumstances. To that extent the dis-
trict court's instruction arguably was in error." Id. at 710. Nevertheless, the court
warned that "it would appear prudent to release only those projections that are reason-
ably certain." Id.
73. See, e.g., Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 q(l) (1982); Exchange Act §§ 9,
10(b), 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j(b), 78p (1982). Although recent events indicate that
insider trading still prevails as a market abuse, the frequency of trading on material
confidential information by corporate fiduciaries apparently has been reduced. See gener-
ally Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, 41 Bus. LAW. 223
(1985).
74. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTER-
STATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM, H.R.
Doc. No. 134, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976) ("As bankruptcies exposed abusive corpo-
rate financing and trading practices and appalling losses to individual investors and the
American public, President Franklin Roosevelt and the Congress responded with the
[federal securities laws]."); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934), reprinted
in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES Ex-
CHANGE ACT OF 1934, item 18, at 13 (1973) ("A renewal of investors' confidence in the
exchange markets can be effected only by a clearer recognition upon the part of the
corporate managers of companies whose securities are publicly held of their responsibil-
ities as trustees for their corporations. Men charged with the administration of other
people's money must not use inside information for their own advantage.").
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tices; to maximize timely, accurate, and complete disclosure of
factual, verifiable data; and to prevent the dissemination of informa-
tion that might be materially misleading.75 Because soft informa-
tion is uncertain and potentially misleading to investors, the SEC
adopted a position disfavoring its disclosure.76 But, as the shock of
the stock market collapse dissipated, the increased sophistication of
the securities industry along with the recurrence of disclosure issues
in the merger and other acquisition contexts signified that the po-
tential value to investors of certain soft information warranted a re-
assessment of the Commission's nondisclosure position.77
In view of these changed circumstances, the Commission recog-
nized that certain forward-looking disclosures may be more helpful
than harmful to investor interests.7" Accordingly, the SEC permit-
ted issuers to use projections in their registration statements (under
the 1933 Act) and in periodic filings (under the 1934 Act).79 In opt-
ing for a voluntary disclosure framework with respect to soft infor-
mation, the SEC made clear that sufficient detail must be provided
to enable investors to evaluate intelligently the soft information dis-
closed.8" The Commission also warned against disclosures being
misleading and pronounced that issuers have a duty to correct fil-
ings that originally contained materially incorrect or misleading in-
formation. Similarly, when information, although initially accurate,
becomes false or misleading due to subsequent events, it must be
updated. 8'
75. See, e.g., Empirical Research Project, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statutes: New
Importance for an Old Battleground, 7J. CORP. L. 689, 698-700 (1982).
76. See supra notes 62, 66.
77. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text; infra notes 78-87 and accompany-
ing text.
78. See Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Secur-
ities Act Release No. 5992, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,756, at
81,036 (Nov. 7, 1978) ("[T]he availability of forward-looking and analytical information
is important to an investor's assessment of a corporation's future earning power and
may be material to informed investor decision-making.").
79. See Statement by the Commission on Disclosure of Projections of Future Eco-
nomic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,461, at 86,201-02 (Apr. 23, 1976).
80. Id. Some commentators have advocated mandatory disclosure of projections be-
cause of the significance of future earnings information. See H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 25 (1979); see also supra
note 70.
81. See Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, supra note 62, at 81,943-44. Accord Panter
v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 292 (7th Cir. 1980) ("While it is true there is no
duty upon management or directors to disclose financial projections .... it is also axio-
matic that once a company undertakes partial disclosure of such information there is a
duty to make the full disclosure of known facts necessary to avoid making such state-
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Wary of liability should disclosed projections not become real-
ity, issuers exercised caution, resulting in the infrequent disclosure
of soft information. 2 In 1979 the SEC addressed this concern by
creating a safe harbor rule. Generally, rule 175 provides protection
against liability for issuer forward-looking statements that do not
bear fruition, provided they were made in good faith and with a rea-
sonable basis.13 Likewise, the SEC has become more receptive to-
ward disclosure of appraisals.8 4 For example, in 1980 the SEC
authorized disclosure of asset appraisals when all or part of the sub-
ject company's assets were to be liquidated. 5 This information is
particularly significant in the context of mergers and related transac-
tions, because asset valuations are a critical factor in shareholder
decisionmaking. More recently, in Flynn v. Bass Brothers Enterprises6
the Third Circuit, taking its cue from these SEC pronouncements
regarding disclosure of soft information, established (on an ad hoc
basis) an affirmative duty to disclose soft information." However,
before turning to the recent decisions on point, because of the pau-
city of case law it is instructive to examine the rationale underlying
some of the earlier cases.
ments misleading."); SEC regulation S-K, item 10(b), 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3)(iii)
(1986) ("With respect to previously issued projections, registrants are reminded of their
responsibility to make full and prompt disclosure of material facts, both favorable and
unfavorable, regarding their financial condition.").
82. See Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, supra note 62, at 81,939.
83. Under rule 175, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the "soft" informa-
tion disclosed did not have a reasonable basis and was not made in good faith. See 17
C.F.R. § 230.175(a) (1986).
84. See 17 C.F.R. § 241.16833 (1986) (authorizing disclosure of good faith appraisals
made with a reasonable basis in proxy contests involving proposals for the liquidation of
all or a portion of a subject company's assets); Brief for the Securities and Exchange
Commission as Amicus Curiae, Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66
(E.D.N.Y. 1969), modified, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
85. See Interpretive Release Relating to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No.
16,833, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,117, at 17,621-12 (May 23, 1980). See also SEC
schedule 13E-3, item 9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1986) (with respect to going private
transactions, "[s]tate whether or not the issuer or affiliate has received any ... appraisal
from an outside party which is materially related to the Rule 13e-3 transaction..." and
"[f]urnish a summary concerning such ... appraisal which shall include, but not be
limited to, the procedures followed; the findings and recommendations; the bases for
and methods of arriving at such findings and recommendations; instructions received
from the issuer or affiliate; and any limitation imposed by the issuer or affiliate on the
scope of the investigation."). For a discussion of the concern that investors might be
misled, see Kripke, Rule lOb-5 Liability and "Material" "Facts", 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061,
1071-72 (1971). See generally Brown, Corporate Communications and the Federal Securities
Laws, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 741, 792-803 (1985); Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Infor-
mational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979).
86. 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984).
87. Id. at 988.
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Prior to Flynn the leading case on appraisal disclosure was Gers-
tle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. 8 In Gerstle the subject companies disclosed
only the book value of the assets in the proxy statement issued prior
to the merger. The plaintiffs contended that by failing to disclose
the appraised asset values, a material fact had been omitted in viola-
tion of rule 14a-9.89 Under the merger agreement, shareholders
were to receive only the stock's book value, which was significantly
less than the appraised value (which proved to be more accurate). 90
The Second Circuit held that, because "[i]t has long been an article
of faith among lawyers specializing in the securities field that ap-
praisals of assets could not be included in a proxy statement," there
was no duty to make such disclosure.9' Similarly, in Kohn v. American
Metal Climax, Inc. 92 the Third Circuit concluded that asset appraisals
prepared for purposes of negotiating a merger were not "truly relia-
ble."9 In support of its holding, the court relied on the positions of
other courts and the SEC discouraging the inclusion of asset ap-
praisals in proxy statements.94 Consequently, the general rule prior
to Flynn was that issuers would not be liable for declining to reveal
projections and asset appraisals. It is significant that rather than
analyzing whether, under the circumstances of the case, the soft in-
formation would have been important to shareholder decisionmak-
ing, these decisions were based upon precedent and the historical
rationale for nondisclosure. Indeed, this view continues to repre-
sent the prevailing approach. 95
On the other hand, a minority of courts prior to Flynn treated
soft information as being material in certain circumstances. Gener-
ally in those cases, insiders were trading in the stock and the soft
information was considered peculiarly reliable. For example, in
Speed v. Transamerica Corp.96 the court imposed liability under rule
lOb-5 on corporate insiders who used inside soft information relat-
ing to the increased value of the issuer's tobacco inventory to buy
out minority shareholders at book value. Because tobacco is an ac-
88. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
89. Id. at 1289. See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1986).
90. 478 F.2d at 1286-87.
91. Id. at 1293. See also id. at 1292 (stating that "the policy embodied in the note to
Rule 14a-9 has consistently been enforced to bar disclosure of asset appraisals").
92. 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
93. Id. at 265.
94. Id. (citing Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & NW. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 408-09 (N.D.
Il1. 1964)).
95. See cases cited supra note 72,
96. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd in relevant part, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
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tively traded commodity with a readily ascertainable market price,
the value of the tobacco inventory (and disclosure thereof) would
not have involved much speculation or conjecture.97 SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co. 98 involved insiders who traded on a visual evaluation
of a drill core sample from a new mining site, which indicated "the
existence of a mine of ... vast magnitude."99 They were found lia-
ble under rule lOb-5, the rationale being that, if corporate insiders
treated the appraisal as significant, then such information, despite
its speculative nature, may be material.' 00
While soft information historically has been treated as immate-
rial as a matter of law, an emerging, although still minority, view
clearly suggests that this is no longer so.' The leading case for the
proposition that there is an affirmative duty to disclose soft informa-
tion when certain indicia of reliability are present is Flynn v. Bass
Brothers Enterprises. 102 In that case the Third Circuit canvassed the
events marking what it considered to be the emergence of a new
public policy favoring the disclosure of soft information, spawned
"in response to developing corporate trends, such as the increase in
mergers,"' 0 3 and held:
97. Id. at 812, 825-27.
98. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
99. Id. at 849.
100. Id. at 848-53. See aso Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th
Cir. 1970) (finding that once disclosure of estimate of future revenues from oil wells was
disclosed, lower estimates of independent appraisals should have been disclosed); Lynch
v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977) (finding that tender offeror
selectively disclosed only the lowest estimate of target's net asset value). One of the
older cases that is contrary to the prevailing view is Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), in which the court, despite finding the valua-
tions of an insurance company's "surplus surplus" to be based upon subjective judg-
ments, held that disclosure was mandatory. Id. at 522-24, 563-66. The court reasoned
that because of the significant variation in estimates (between $50 and $125 million),
which formed the primary reason underlying the takeover bid, all the estimates were
material to shareholders in evaluating the value of their shares, and should have been
disclosed. Id. at 563-66.
101. For cases indicating that projections and appraisals may be material see Vaughn
v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1980) (partial disclosure case); Sun-
strand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1046 (7th Cir.) (partial disclosure
case), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); SEC v. Stuart, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,908 (N.D. Tex. 1985). Professor Kripke points out that, in
certain respects, reasonable projections of future earnings may be more significant to
investment decisionmaking than past earnings because historical earnings rarely have
predictive value. See Kripke, A Search for a Meaningful Securities Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus.
LAw. 293, 298, 311-12 (1975).
102. 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984).
103. Id. at 986.
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In order to give full effect to the evolution in the law of
disclosure .... today we set forth the law for disclosure of
soft information as it is to be applied from this date on.
Henceforth, the law is not that asset appraisals are, as a
matter of law, immaterial. Rather, in appropriate cases,
such information must be disclosed. Courts should ascer-
tain the duty to disclose asset valuations and other soft in-
formation on a case by case basis, by weighing the potential
aid such information will give a shareholder against the po-
tential harm, such as undue reliance, if the information is
released with a proper cautionary note.
The factors a court must consider in making such a de-
termination are: the facts upon which the information is
based; the qualifications of those who prepared or com-
piled it; the purpose for which the information was origi-
nally intended; its relevance to the stockholders'
impending decision; the degree of subjectivity or bias re-
flected in its preparation; the degree to which the informa-
tion is unique; and the availability to the investor of other
more reliable sources of information.10 4
Sharply contrasting Flynn is the Sixth Circuit's approach in
Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co. ,"05 in which the court declined to recog-
nize a mandatory obligation to disclose asset appraisals or financial
projections, unless "the predictions underlying the appraisal or pro-
jection are substantially certain to hold."'0 6 Criticizing the Third
Circuit's approach in Flynn, the Sixth Circuit reasoned:
By its very nature ... this sort of judicial cost-benefit
analysis [referring to Flynn] is uncertain and unpredictable,
and it moreover neglects the role of the market in provid-
ing shareholders with information regarding the target's
value through competing tender offers. Our approach,
which focuses on the certainty of the data underlying the
appraisal or projection, ensures that the target company's
shareholders will receive all essentially factual information,
while preserving the target's discretion to disclose more
104. Id. at 988. See generally Note, Disclosure of Soft Information in Tender Offers After Flynn
v. Bass Brothers Enterprises, Inc., 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 (1985); cf. Radol v. Thomas,
556 F. Supp. 586, 593-94 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (denying summary judgment because ap-
praisals prepared in anticipation of hostile tender offer might have been material under
the Sixth Circuit's "substantial certainty" test), aff'd on other grounds, 772 F.2d 244, 253,
(6th Cir. 1985) (dictum) ("District court should have ruled that the reports were not
material and removed them from the jury.").
105. 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986).
106. Id. at 241.
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uncertain information without the threat of liability,
provided appropriate qualifications and explanations are
made.10 7
Flynn represents an approach aimed at addressing investor con-
cerns, whereas Starkman illustrates the disclosure concerns from an
issuer's perspective. Both views have merit, but each is too one-
sided. The cost-benefit analysis advocated by the Third Circuit does
not promote certainty, because the approach calls for a court to de-
termine the qualitative value of the enumerated factors with the
benefit of hindsight and on an ad hoc basis. Under this approach,
judicial guidelines may well have little stability, because the subjec-
tive nature of the inquiry is likely to result in the factors being ap-
plied differently under an ad hoc analysis. In addition, the Third
Circuit's desire "to give full effect to the evolution in the law of dis-
closure"' 0 8 overlooks the fact that, while the securities laws are
designed to protect investors, they are not intended to impose un-
due hardship upon issuers. The issuer's duty to disclose should be
based on what is fair and reasonable from both an investor's and an
issuer's perspective.' 0 9
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit's approach in Starkman is
107. Id. at 242. The Sixth Circuit further explained:
Under this standard, Marathon plainly had no duty to disclose the Strong
and First Boston reports, because these reports contained estimates of the
value of probable, potential and unexplored oil and gas reserves which were
based on highly speculative assumptions regarding the path of oil and gas
prices, recovery rates and the like over a period of thirty to fifty years. Disclo-
sure of such estimated values could well have been misleading without an ac-
companying mountain of data and explanations. There is no reported case
actually holding that disclosure of appraised values of oil and gas reserves is
required, and several which agree with our decision that such disclosure is not
required.
Similarly, Marathon had no duty to disclose the five-year earnings and cash
flow projections given to Steel and First Boston. This information does not rise
to the level of substantial certainty triggering a duty to disclose.
Id. (footnote omitted). See Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that
SEC rule 13e-3 does not apply to merger consummated within one year of tender offer
when same price paid as in tender offer), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986); Biechele v.
Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding no duty to disclose appraisal
prepared as a selling document in on-going merger discussions).
108. Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 988 (3d Cir. 1984).
109. Merger and related acquisition negotiations impose considerable pressure on the
subject corporations' managements. The potential impact of proposals and counter-
proposals often must be quickly and thoroughly evaluated. Moreover, there may be one
or more competing offers to consider. In friendly acquisitions, confidentiality and tim-
ing usually are critical, both with regard to price and to consummation of the transac-
tion. See generally TENDER OFFERS: DEVELOPMENTS & COMMENTARIES (M. Steinberg ed.
1985).
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too rigid.'O Disclosure, a key concept underlying the securities
laws, is subordinated to the perceived need to avoid imposing liabil-
ity in circumstances in which certainty cannot be assured. The
Starkman court's concern is misplaced, because an important policy
underlying the disclosure doctrine is issuer fair dealing through the
sharing of information that is material to investor decisionmaking.
Congress, the SEC, and the courts require issuers to make accurate
and complete disclosure of available material information in order
to enhance the level of investor decisionmaking and to ensure that
the information disclosed is not materially misleading."1 ' All that
should be required in the context of soft information is that the
available material data be accurately disclosed; it need not be
certain.
Clearly, there is a need for an approach that embraces both in-
vestor and issuer concerns. While an affirmative duty to disclose has
been held to exist only in certain well-defined situations," t 2 consis-
tent application of the disclosure principle underlying the securities
laws requires that, to ensure investor decisionmaking based on a
flow of accurate information between the issuer and the financial
markets, soft information must be affirmatively disclosed in certain
circumstances. Hence, the following two-prong test should be
adopted for establishing when there is an affirmative duty to dis-
close soft information: (1) the information must be material and ripe
for disclosure and (2) the failure to disclose must be fundamentally
unfair to stockholders.
In seeking to establish the ripeness element of materiality
under the first prong, one should bear in mind that certainty, in re-
ality, is a matter of degree. Although soft information, by definition,
lacks the objective certainty that customarily gives rise to a duty to
disclose, such information can be highly informative and significant
to investors. 1 3 Thus, it seems specious to deny investors access to
valuable information merely because the veracity of the data cannot
be proved by hard facts. If the information objectively may be
viewed as significant to investors and not likely to cause investors to
place undue detrimental reliance thereon," t4 then it is material and
110. See supra text accompanying notes 105-107.
111. See M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS: A CORPORATE AND SECURITIES
LAW PERSPECTIVE 28-38, 73-98, 163-98 (1983).
112. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 78-87, 101-104 and accompanying text. See also Brown, supra note
85, at 797 & n.252.
114. Cf supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
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ripe for disclosure. Concerns about investors being misled due to
the "softness" of the information may be overcome in most in-
stances by ensuring that the facts upon which the information is
based are fairly presented with an appropriate cautionary note. The
factors enumerated in Flynn provide a helpful guide.115 Sophisti-
cated investors should not be deprived of significant information
merely to protect the unsophisticated. In view of the frequency of
mergers, the increased flow of information to the financial markets,
and the greater sophistication of the investing public, the concerns
that in the past may have justified, or at least explained, judicial pa-
ternalism are no longer convincing.
After establishing that the soft information was ripe for disclo-
sure, to establish the second prong a plaintiff must prove that by not
disclosing the soft information at the time it is alleged such informa-
tion should have been disclosed, corporate management acted in a
manner fundamentally unfair to stockholders. 6 In particular, non-
disclosure would be fundamentally unfair (1) if the issuer's board of
directors did not consider the interests of stockholders, or (2) if the
board of directors did consider the interests of stockholders, but,
under all the circumstances, (a) the decision clearly is not supported
by the facts, or (b) no significant identifiable corporate interest is
reasonably likely to be advanced by withholding the information. A
board of director's omission to document in detail its deliberations
and reasoning should constitute prima facie evidence that the board
acted in a manner fundamentally unfair to stockholders. In view of
the importance of such a decision to investors, one can hardly be
sympathetic to objections grounded on undue burdens being im-
posed on corporate management. This is precisely the kind of effort
directors are expected to exert in fulfilling their disclosure obliga-
tions under the federal securities laws." 7
115. See supra text accompanying note 104.
116. This argument, premising federal disclosure obligations on the nature of fiduci-
ary duty relationships, is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). In a private damages action under § 10(b) for nondis-
closure of soft information, reckless misconduct, as construed by the lower federal
courts, satisfies § 10(b)'s scienter requirement. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976); M. STEINBERG, supra note 3, at § 7.02 (and cases cited therein). If the
alleged violation is of the reporting requirements under §§ 13(a) or 15(d) of the Ex-
change Act (most likely in an SEC enforcement action), then negligent conduct may well
be sufficient to impose liability. Moreover, in those jurisdictions that recognize a private
right of action for damages under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, negligence may constitute
sufficient culpability to impose liability. See infra note 140.
117. Cf. Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980) (recogniz-
ing directors' structural bias), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981); Smith v. Van Gorkom,
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This section illustrates that when soft information is both highly
significant to investor decisionmaking and ripe for disclosure, it
should be disclosed unless there is a reasonable business justifica-
tion for withholding the information. Although the imposition of an
affirmative duty to disclose soft information may expose issuers to
considerable liability risks, closer analysis of the duty indicates that
issuers are expected to do no more than consider and act in the best
interests of the company and its stockholders. Only material infor-
mation that is ripe for disclosure need be disclosed, and if a rational,
good faith disclosure of available data with appropriate cautionary
notation is provided, the issuer will have satisfied its disclosure
obligations. 118
IV. DUTY TO DISCLOSE BAD NEWS
"Bad news" usually refers to circumstances having an adverse
financial impact upon the corporation, such as the loss of one or
more major customers or valuable contracts, the initiation of a sig-
nificant lawsuit or SEC enforcement action, events giving rise to
troubling liquidity problems, impending changes in corporate man-
agement, or the loss of special advisers upon whom corporate man-
agement has come to rely." 9 Although disclosure of bad news may
result in investor over-reaction, possibly causing substantial harm to
the subject corporation's business, bad news is precisely the kind of
disclosure that is essential to maintaining informed financial
markets.
The reasons for issuer reluctance to disclose bad news concern-
ing the company are axiomatic. Equally obvious is the significance
of such information to investors. The periodic reports that issuers
are required to file under the Exchange Act are comprehensive, 20
and one generally cannot omit bad news without violating the secur-
ities laws.' 2 ' However, certain disclosure loopholes exist, because
488 A.2d 858 (Del, 1985) (finding that director has duty under Delaware law to exercise
informed business judgment); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814
(1981) (similar duty under New Jersey law).
118. For a discussion relating to this subject and generally to issuer affirmative disclo-
sure obligations, see M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION, 637-71 (1986).
119. Certain of these disclosures, such as the resignation of the issuer's certifying ac-
countant, must be promptly disclosed by filing a form 8-K. See infra note 130.
120. See infra notes 124-133 and accompanying text.
121. See infra note 128; cf. Segal v. Coburn Corp. of Am., [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,002 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (finding that company need not disclose
its decision to withdraw from installment finance business because it reasonably feared
negative impact on the collectibility of its paper and its credit relations, and that busi-
ness may be forced into sudden liquidation).
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there is no specific SEC rule mandating disclosure of material, ad-
verse financial information between periodic reports. This section
considers whether an affirmative duty to disclose bad news arising
between periodic reports should be imposed. The discussion does
not encompass situations in which an affirmative disclosure obliga-
tion already has been established, such as with the duty to update or
correct prior disclosures. For example, if an issuer has disclosed the
identity of a major customer (and the amount of business transacted
with that customer) in a disclosure document previously filed with
the SEC or disseminated to shareholders, 22 the irretrievable loss of
that customer's account should be promptly disclosed pursuant to
the duty to update.'23
The affirmative disclosure issue relating to adverse financial in-
formation normally arises during an interval in which the issuer is
not required to file a periodic report with the SEC. Under the Ex-
change Act an issuer is required, inter alia, to file annual reports on
form 10-K, 124 quarterly reports on form 10-Q 2 5 and current re-
ports on form 8-K. 126 The regulations that mandate the filing of
these reports are very specific as to what is required to be disclosed
in the various line items. For example, form 10-K requires, among
other things, an extensive discussion of the issuer's business, au-
dited financial statements, disclosures regarding certain legal pro-
ceedings, and a management discussion and analysis (MD&A).' 27
With respect to the MD&A, mandated disclosures include identify-
ing "any known trends or any known demands, commitments,
events or uncertainties that will result in or that are reasonably likely
to result in the registrant's liquidity increasing or decreasing in any
material way. .." and a description of "any known trends or uncer-
tainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will
have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or reve-
nues or income from continuing operations. "128
122. See SEC Regulation S-K, item 101, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(vii) (1986).
123. Cf. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that man-
ufacturer had duty to correct statements projecting promising market future for Dalkon
Shield), rev'd on other grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979).
124. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1986) (annual report pursuant to §§ 13 or 15(d) of the
Exchange Act).
125. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (1986) (quarterly report under §§ 13 or 15(d) of the Ex-
change Act).
126. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1986) (current report).
127. SEC form 10-K, items 1-3, 6-9, 14, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1986).
128. Id. item 7 (calling for information required by item 303 of regulation S-K). The
SEC has instituted enforcement actions for an issuer's failure to adhere to the disclo-
sures required by the MD&A. See, e.g., In the Matter of Ronson Corp., Exchange Act
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Quarterly reports (on form 10-Q) also must contain an MD&A
and other extensive disclosures, including unaudited interim finan-
cial information prepared in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting principles (GAAP).' 2 9 In addition, periodic disclosure on
form 8-K is required to facilitate current disclosure of certain signifi-
cant events. A key problem with the form 8-K disclosure obligation
is that it is mandatory only with respect to certain specified
events.' 30 Disclosure of other events is permissive.' 3' Although the
Commission has issued a number of releases urging corporate man-
agements to review their disclosure policies "and endeavor to set up
procedures which will insure that prompt disclosure be made of ma-
terial corporate developments both favorable and unfavorable, so
that investor confidence can be maintained in an orderly and effec-
tive securities market,"' 32 the Commission has declined to mandate
affirmative disclosure of bad news arising between quarterly reports.
Also, there is a dearth of judicial authority on the issue. Thus, be-
cause there currently is no general affirmative duty to disclose even
material information regarding the issuer except in certain specific
circumstances, 3 issuers' disinclination to make such disclosure is
not surprising.
Accordingly, the central issue in this context is one of timing. 134
Issuers understandably wish to delay disclosure of adverse news as
Release No. 19,212, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,275 (Nov. 4,
1982). See also 1 M. STEINBERG & R. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE
ENFORCEMENT § 2:16 (1985) (discussing SEC enforcement actions brought for financial
fraud).
129. SEC form 10-Q, part I, items 1-2, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (1986).
130. The following items are mandatory under form 8-K: changes in control of regis-
trant (item 1), acquisition or disposition of assets (item 2), bankruptcy or receivership
(item 3), changes in registrant's certifying accountant (item 4), and resignations of regis-
trant's directors (item 6).
131. See, SEC form 8-K, item 5, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1986) ("The registrant may, at
its option, report under this item any events, with respect to which information is not
otherwise called for by this form, that the registrant deems of importance to security
holders.").
132. In the Matter of Sharon Steel Corp. as it Relates to Prompt Corporate Disclo-
sure, Exchange Act Release No. 18,271, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
83,049, at 84,615 (Nov. 19, 1981). See also In the Matter of Fidelity Fin. Corp. and
Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n, Exchange Act Release No. 18,927, [1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,239 (July 30, 1982) (SEC, in a § 21(a) report, criticizing
corporation's year-end press release announcing losses for the year but not indicating
impact of continued losses on future operations when losses substantially affected short-
term viability; statement reporting "business as usual" in such circumstances raised an-
tifraud problems).
133. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
134. See generally SEC forms 10-K, 10-Q, 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.308a, 310 (1986) (items
enumerated therein).
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long as possible. For example, during the interim before the next
form 1O-Q must be filed, perhaps new major contracts can be pro-
cured to replace the ones that were terminated. Immediate disclo-
sure, according to management, could have a "snowball" effect,
depressing the company's business and the price of its stock in the
securities markets.
Generally, there is little authority to support an affirmative duty
to disclose adverse news during the period between SEC-required
reports. Courts have held that the timing of disclosure is a matter of
business judgment.' 3 5 Under this concept disclosure may be de-
ferred until the information is ripe, or withheld if a valid business
reason exists, such as when premature disclosure would jeopardize
a contract.' 3 6 On the other hand, if the material information clearly
is ripe and the business justifications proffered are not compelling,
there is a plausible case for imposing liability for nondisclosure. A
court should balance the potential impact of disclosing the bad news
against the fiduciary duty owed to shareholders.
37
Although an issuer's refusal to disclose bad news for fear of in-
vestor reaction does not justify withholding disclosure, there are a
number of legitimate arguments against the blanket imposition of
an affirmative duty to disclose bad news. Coping with the vicissi-
tudes of business is what entrepreneurship is all about. Corporate
management needs the flexibility to find means of overcoming set-
backs. Stockholder confidence in management's ability to do so
presumably is why shareholders elected to invest in that enterprise.
Furthermore, the securities laws were not intended to stifle corpo-
rate management's ability to run the company's daily business oper-
ations. In recognition of these interests, the current SEC periodic
reporting requirements require comprehensive disclosure at speci-
135. See, e.g., Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 683 F.2d 51, 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1982); State
Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor, 654 F.2d 843, 853 (2d Cir. 1981); Financial Indus.
Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 518-22 (10th Cir.) (en banc) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). Under the business judgment rule, disclosure
may be deferred if premature disclosure would jeopardize a contract or until the infor-
mation is ripe. See, e.g., Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983)
(disclosure of nonmaterial negotiations "is a matter of corporate discretion"); Elkind v.
Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 162-64 (2d Cir. 1980) (no duty to disclose dismal
internal projections); SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 50 (2d Cir. 1976) (generally no
duty to disclose "raw, unverified" information); Financial Indus. Fund, 474 F.2d at 519
("To be ripe ... the contents must be verified sufficiently to permit the officers and
directors to have confidence in their accuracy ... and there [can be] no valid corporate
purpose which dictates the information be not disclosed.").
136. See supra note 135.
137. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
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fled intervals but also leave corporate management some flexibility
in the interim. 13' Given an opportunity to reflect, the issuer may be
able to salvage or replace the "lost" contracts, or to resolve the
problem and reverse the setback. Mandating immediate disclosure
may result in panic selling, depressing the company's business and
the price of its stock.
On the other hand, there is a need to ensure that bad news that
undoubtedly will have an adverse impact on the company is dis-
closed without undue delay. In such instances, the issue is primarily
materiality rather than timing. If there is no reasonable prospect of
avoiding the adverse impact of whatever event transpired, there is
no justification for delaying disclosure until the next periodic re-
port. In that event the only issue should be whether the information
is material, referring to the importance of such information to inves-
tors. The information is ripe for disclosure, because it is certain that
there will be an adverse impact. Investors are entitled to know what
has happened so that they can protect their financial interests as
they see fit. Prompt disclosure often is critical, because even a slight
delay can have catastrophic consequences for investors and the in-
tegrity of the financial markets.
By letting issuers elect not to disclose this material bad news,
the SEC has neglected investors and its own responsibility to pro-
mote the disclosure objectives underlying the securities laws. To
remedy this deficiency the Commission should amend form 8-K to
require prompt disclosure of any event that the issuer knows or has
reason to know will have a material, adverse impact on the enter-
prise. Mandated disclosures, for example, would include (if finan-
cially material): the irretrievable loss of customer contracts; known
problems that raise liquidity concerns; and the occurrence of any
event that affects the issuer's net sales, revenues, or income.13 9
There may exist circumstances under which an issuer has legiti-
mate business justifications for declining to disclose the mandated
information. Requiring disclosure, irrespective of the existence of
valid business reasons for confidentiality, is likely to injure the com-
pany and its shareholders. Therefore, an issuer should be able to
invoke an affirmative defense of legitimate business justification for
nondisclosure. Hence, under the suggested framework an issuer's
failure to disclose the adverse financial news, as required under the
138. See supra notes 124-133 and accompanying text.
139. Cf id.
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amendments to form 8-K, would be a prima facie violation. 4 ' The
issuer may avoid liability by establishing that (1) it had reasonable
and identifiable grounds for believing that the potential conse-
quences of the adverse event could be neutralized, (2) it diligently
pursued a considered plan for accomplishing this objective, and
(3) disclosure would have presented a substantial, identifiable threat
to the continued viability of the company's business. The issuer
must point to concrete conditions that posed a legitimate threat to
the company's business in order to establish its affirmative defense.
Unsubstantiated fears of future loss of business are insufficient.
Under the proposed framework issuers normally may protect
themselves by acting reasonably and carefully documenting their
deliberations and decisions. Generally, if the issuer acted in a re-
sponsible manner, no liability should ensue. This proposed frame-
work provides an equitable balance between the shareholders' right
to be informed promptly of material developments and the legiti-
mate interest of issuers to maintain confidentiality if necessitated by
legitimate business reasons.
V. CONCLUSION
Questions concerning issuer affirmative disclosure obligations
raise difficult public policy issues. In seeking a proper balance, le-
gitimate concerns of both issuers and investors should be ad-
dressed. On the one hand, issuers should be required to
affirmatively disclose only if there are sufficiently clear guidelines in
140. The prima facie violation would be that of the reporting requirements of
§§ 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act. Of course, if scienter were proven, a § 10(b)
right of action may also exist. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See also supra note 116 and accompanying text.
Whether shareholders have an implied right of action for damages based on violation of
the reporting requirements remains an open issue, although most courts have declined
to imply such a remedy. See Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 556, 594-98 (1982) (and cases cited
therein). The article states:
[T]he primary objective of [the reporting] provisions is to mandate the filing of
certain pertinent information, rather than to provide an anti-fraud prohibition.
[Moreover], to authorize an implied remedy for damages under section 13(a) or
13(d) would indirectly circumvent the purchaser-seller requirement under sec-
tion 10(b), thereby permitting allegedly aggrieved parties to bring suit on the
theory that they would have purchased [or] sold their stock if the filed informa-
tion had been accurate. Such a result would raise the possibility of vexatious
litigation, the very consequence that the Supreme Court sought to alleviate. In
this regard, if the plaintiff is a purchaser or seller, he has an adequate remedy
under section 10(b) ....
Id. at 596.
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effect and only if legitimate business interests will not be impeded
by such disclosure. On the other hand, investors and the market-
place should be entitled to all material financial information that is
ripe for disclosure, in a manner that is not misleading to investors,
and that does not impose an unduly rigorous burden upon issuers.
This article offers a practical, analytical framework for accommodat-
ing the different interests in the varying contexts in which questions
concerning issuer affirmative disclosure obligations arise.
Generally, merger negotiations should be disclosed if the infor-
mation is ripe for disclosure, that is, if there is a firm offer or an
agreement in principle encompassing fundamental terms, or, alter-
natively, if there is an SEC rule that specifically requires disclosure.
Preliminary merger discussions usually are too indefinite for reason-
able investor reliance and, therefore, are not ripe for disclosure.
Materiality should not be applied uniformly as a generally applicable
concept, because the materiality threshold differs in different situa-
tional contexts.' 41 Moreover, it is inequitable to subject issuers to
both the burden of disclosure and the risk of liability by mandating
disclosure in the absence of definitive guidelines as to when disclo-
sure is required. The requirement that there be a firm offer or an
agreement in principle encompassing fundamental terms, such as
price and structure, provides a pragmatic yardstick for measuring
ripeness.
The area of soft information disclosure is especially complex. A
number of courts, through judicial paternalism, have denied inves-
tors vital information, a consequence at variance with the protec-
tions that the securities laws were designed to afford. Investors have
reached a considerably higher level of sophistication in the financial
markets than they had at the time the securities laws were enacted.
Consequently, there is a need for the fullest practicable flow of in-
formation to the financial markets. It is accuracy, not certainty, that
prevents investors from being misled. Generally, if soft information
is ripe for disclosure and it would be fundamentally unfair not to
disclose, disclosure should be mandatory. An appropriate caution-
141. At first blush, this proposition seems to conflict with the Supreme Court's state-
ment that information is material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important" in making his investment decision. TSC In-
dus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). However, the Court merely addressed
the type of information that a shareholder (or investor) may consider material, and not
whether that information necessarily has to be disclosed. Thus, materiality in the con-
text of an affirmative duty to disclose largely should be measured by the concept of
ripeness. Ripeness, in turn, incorporates both the significance of the information and its
reliability.
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ary notation can direct investors to the uncertainties reflected in
such information. There should be no liability if the board of direc-
tors makes a good faith determination that a significant identifiable
business interest will be advanced by withholding disclosure and
acts pursuant to a reasonable business plan to achieve that benefit.
Similarly, there should be an affirmative duty to disclose certain
bad financial news that arises in the interval between periodic re-
ports. Unless the issuer can show that there are legitimate business
justifications for not disclosing the bad news, the issuer should be
required to disclose. Liability for nondisclosure should not be im-
posed if there are reasonable and identifiable grounds for believing
that the setback is reasonably likely to be neutralized or reversed,
the issuer pursues a plan for accomplishing that objective, and pre-
mature disclosure would create a substantial threat to the continued
viability of the company. Absent these circumstances, shareholders
and the financial markets are entitled to prompt disclosure. Delay,
however short, can have catastrophic consequences.
